FROM PERFORMANCE VISIBILITY TO STRUCTURED INTERVENTION: A CONCEPTUAL AND DOCUMENTARY FRAMEWORK FOR DATA-DRIVEN FRANCHISE GOVERNANCE IN MULTI-UNIT NETWORKS

Bruna Godoy

doi:10.5281/zenodo.21831724

Abstract

Multi-unit franchise networks face a recurring problem: corporate-level strategy does not automatically translate
into consistent unit-level execution. This exploratory study develops a conceptual and applied model of datadriven franchise governance named the Five-Layer Data-Driven Franchise Governance Framework. The model
integrates five complementary layers: performance visibility, management cadence, accountability, operator
capability, and structured intervention. The study combines an integrative review of the literature on franchise
governance, management control systems, and performance measurement with a retrospective documentary
illustration from a Brazilian business-education franchise network comprising more than thirty units during the
period examined. The preliminary corpus includes organizational charts, performance presentations, KPI
definitions, action plans, monitoring records, onboarding and training materials, franchise-economics
documents, and a ninety-day recovery plan. The analysis distinguishes documented results, interpretive findings,
and theoretical propositions. Findings indicate that indicators alone do not generate execution; their value
depends on interpretation routines, explicit ownership, capability development, and graduated responses to
deviations. The original contribution is the organization of mechanisms already recognized in the literature into
an integrated and testable operational sequence. The study does not conduct a causal test and does not attribute
financial outcomes to the author or to the framework. The article presents propositions, practical applications, a
diagnostic checklist, and an agenda for future empirical validation.

Keywords

franchise governance; performance measurement; multi-unit networks; accountability; operator capability.

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